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A Growth Model of “Miracle” in Korea
Atsuko Ueda, University of Tsukuba
High economic performance in East Asia has motivated arguments on the sources of
economic growth, including the role of the government to encourage more investment than
would have been allocated by market forces. The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively
investigate whether or not macroeconomic investment behavior of a growing economy
can be explained by market forces. Focusing on Korea during the period 1960–90, a sto-
chastic growth model with production is estimated with a numerical solution to approximate
the optimal investment behavior during the course of economic development. The estima-
tion result suggests that market forces do not explain the rise in investment rates in the 1960s
and 1970s, while investment behavior in the 1980s coincides with optimizing investment
behavior. Ó 2000 Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Strong economic performance in East Asia in the last decades
is deserved to be called a “miracle.” Sources of the success in
East Asia have been sought in an outward oriented policy, high
rates of investment, high standard of education, rich and low-
waged labor supply, cultural background, and so on. In addition,
the growth experience in East Asia attracts attention in the context
of the role of the government in driving economic growth. Follow-
ing an early contribution by Jones and Sakong (1980), Amsden
(1989), Wade (1990), and the World Bank (1993) investigate im-
portance of the role of the government in these countries in detail
by giving rich examples.
Pack and Westphal (1986) argue that, in order to achieve inter-
national competitiveness, more investment is required than would
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have been allocated by market forces in a laissez-faire regime.
They look for a reason in market imperfections associated with
technological change; technology is not acquired automatically,
but markets do not fully reflect the cost of acquisition of new
technology. Wade (1990) argues, more strongly, that the static
conditions of market failure are irrelevant for growth and innova-
tion; that is, efficient allocation of resources in a current market
may not be efficient when considering future growth. However,
the arguments of this literature is mainly based on observations
on government interventions, but has not offered empirical evi-
dences to prove that investment in East Asia has been made
beyond market forces.
The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively investigate whether
or not investment behavior in East Asia is explained by market
forces, focusing on the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea)
during the period 1960–90 when Korea achieved rapid economic
growth.
In 1960, the real per capita GDP of Korea was $923, which was
almost the same level as Taiwan ($964), Thailand ($985), and the
Philippines ($1,183).1 By 1985, it was $3,858: slightly lower than
Taiwan, about 50 percent higher than Thailand, and more than
twice that of the Philippines. The annual average growth rate of
Korea was 5.7 percent during 1960–85, while the world average was
2.1 percent. Also, Korea improved in investment rates from 8.6
percent in 1960 to 29.2 percent in 1988, while the investment rates
in the U.S. ranged from 14.9 to 20.1 percent during the same period.
The previous studies on the role of the government consider
the Korean government as the strongest interventionist in East
Asia.2 In the early 1960s, Korea suffered from political instability
and economic stagnation. After Park Chung-Hee took power and
being President from 1963 to 1979, Park implemented various
economic policies, giving the highest priority to economic growth,
including 5-year Economic Development Plans, a low-interest pol-
icy by putting commercial banks under the control of the govern-
ment, nursing Chaebol (conglomerates in the manufacturing sector),
and strong “advice” from bureaucrats. In the 1980s after Park’s
regime, Korea took the first step toward economic liberalization.
1 The figures in this paragraph are from Summers and Heston (1991), real GDP per
capita in 1985 international prices.
2 This paragraph is based on World Bank (1992), Amsden (1989), Mason et al. (1980),
and Jones and Sakong (1980).
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These historical observations are major foundations to claim
the role of the government to promote investment, but there is
little evidence in which investment in Korea has been made beyond
optimizing behavior considering future growth of Korea. Also, it
is not impossible that the government intervention is restricted
to make up for market failure such as underdeveloped financial
market. Then, investment behavior can be explained by market
forces rather than the governmental policies.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a stochas-
tic growth model with production, and develops an estimation
method. It is natural that the people consider further output
growth associated with capital accumulation and productivity
growth into their investment decision. Therefore, this paper ap-
plies a dynamic model with production that allows future capital
accumulation and productivity growth. Furthermore, optimal in-
vestment behavior must be analyzed during the course of eco-
nomic development. For this purpose, the analysis introduces nu-
merical methods to approximate the solution of the dynamic model
and develops a simulation-estimation method. Section 3 describes
the data and preparatory analysis of the production technology
that is used in the estimation. Section 4 presents the estimation
result. The result suggests that the actual investment behavior can
be explained as an optimal behavior in the 1980s, but a rise in
investment rates in the 1960s and the 1970s cannot be explained
by market forces. To investigate the reasons, effects of structural
change and externalities are investigated. Section 5 gives conclud-
ing remarks.
2. A STOCHASTIC GROWTH MODEL
2.1. The Model
Consider the following aggregate production technology
Yt 5 ut · F(Kt, Nt, At),
where Yt is production, ut is a stochastic shock, At is productivity,




F() is a production function, and subscript t denotes period. Produc-
tivity may be raised by R&D efforts, learning-by-doing, spillover
effects of knowledge, public services, and others. Productivity is
assumed to be given for each agent in the competitive economy,
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s.t. ct 1 nt11 · kt11 2 kt 5 yt 2 d · kt
yt 5 ut · F(Kt, Nt, At)/Nt
k0 : given
ln ut 5 r · ln ut21 1 et, et z i.i.d. N(0, s2),





m21 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (m . 0), ct is per capita consump-
tion, yt is per capita output, d is the disposal rate of capital, and lnut is an AR(1)
process (0 < r , 1).
2.2. Estimation Method
Unfortunately, the closed-form solution of the problem (2.1) is
not known except special cases. The solution may be linearly
approximated around the steady state, but such method may not
be appropriate to check the behavior of a growing economy far
from the steady state. Therefore, a nonlinear method that involves
a wide range of the state space is desired to analyze a growing
economy. For this purpose, this paper applies the PEA-Galerkin
algorithm developed by Christiano and Fisher (1994), which is a
hybrid of the projection method developed by Judd (1992) and
PEA (Parameterized Expectations Approach) by den Haan and
Marct (1990).
Step 1: Estimate Parameters of the Production Technol-
ogy. First, estimate a set of parameter z for production technol-
ogy. Set an initial guess for a set of parameters x for preferences.
Step 2: Solve the Problem Numerically. Given an estimate
zˆ at Step 1 and x, obtain a numerical solution that satisfies the
Euler equation
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1 1 2 d) jk, u] > b · exp[h(k, u; a)], (2.2)
where h(k, u; a) is an orthogonal polynomial of state variables (k,
u) with a set of coefficient a, and x9 is the one step ahead of a
variable x.
Step 3: Calculate a Simulated Sequence {c˜t}. Calculate a sim-
ulated sequence {c˜t}, where c˜t 5 c(kt, ut(zˆ), zˆ; x) > (b · exp[h(kt,
uˆt; a)])21/m with the actual capital stock data {kt} and estimated
stochastic shocks {uˆt} given some x and zˆ for t 5 1960 . . . 1990.
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 to Estimate x to Fit the
Simulated Sequence to the Actual Data. Assuming errors are
distributed normally in the log term
ln ct 5 ln c(x;kt, ut(zˆ), zˆ) 1 ht,
where h z i.i.d., N(0, sh). Estimate xˆ by the nonlinear regression.
Accuracy of a numerical solution is tested by the accuracy test
developed by Judd (1992); the Euler equation error is checked at
(kt, uˆt) for all sample years, in addition to (100 3 80) equidistant
grids over the state space.
Step 5: Construct an Asymptotic Confidence Interval of
{c˜t}. Because the numerical solution and an estimated sequence
of stochastic shocks are functions of the parameter set estimated
at Step 1, I construct an asymptotic confidence interval of the
sequence {c˜t} by the Delta method. When Ö n(zˆ 2 z) D! N(0,Sz),
Ö n(c(kt, ut(zˆ), zˆ;xˆ) 2 c(kt, ut(z), z;xˆ) ) D! N(0, DSzD9),
where D is the (1 3 l) gradient vector
D 5 3]c(kt, ut(z), z; xˆ)]z jz5zˆ4.
Because the gradient vector D cannot be calculated analytically,
D is numerically calculated. An asymptotic confidence interval is
constructed by
3c˜t 2 ca · 31nDSzD94
1/2
, c˜t 1 ca · 31nDSzD94
1/2
4,
where ca is a critical value.
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3. DATA AND PARAMETERIZATION
3.1. Data
Macroeconomic variables except capital stock are obtained
from National Accounts 1990, and Economic Statistics Yearbook
by the Bank of Korea. Government consumption, private con-
sumption, GDP, and gross capital formation are in the 1985 con-
stant prices. The ratio of compensation of employees to value
added to calculate TFP (total factor productivity) is also obtained
from the same sources.3 In the estimation, trade deficit, govern-
ment consumption, and an increase of stocks as a transaction cost
are assumed to be exogenous to focus on the optimal allocation
policy between (private) consumption and investment.4 Thus,
Ct 1 It 5 GDPt 2 (Gt 1 Mt 2 Xt 1 DSt),
; Yt
where Gt is government consumption, Mt is import, Xt is export,
and DSt is a change of stocks.
Population is obtained from Korean Statistical Yearbook by
National Statistical Office. The growth rate of population was
nearly 3 percent in 1960, and fell to almost 1 percent in the late
1980s. The growth rate of population is assumed to be a function
of per capita capital stock and be deterministic for simplicity. The
function is nonparametrically smoothed by cubic spline toward
0.4 percent at the deterministic steady state.
Capital stock is obtained from Pyo (1992). This paper uses real
gross capital stock (gross fixed reproducible assets) with the total
of nine industries.5 The disposal rate d is assumed to be 0.02 from
3 The primary sector is excluded from calculation, because of the unreliably low rate
of compensation of employees. Compensation of employees in 1970 is applied for 1960–69
because of lack of the data.
4 In terms of financial account, the deficit of total spending from income must be financed
by external borrowing. In this paper, I implicitly assume that the government controlled
international capital flow, including direct foreign investment (DFI). This seems to be a
reasonable assumption for Korea, because foreign loans required governmental approval
(Jones and Sakong, 1980), and direct foreign investment has been strictly regulated; DFI
was consistently less than 1 percent in Korea, while other Newly Industrialized Countries
in East Asia accepted a DFI of more than 5 percent GDP.
5 A problem of this estimation is that estimated capital retirement is negative. Pyo
(1992) explains “that the capital formation data in national income accounts are underesti-
mated, and that the capital gains accrued are reflected only in latter national wealth
survey.” There seems to be an inconsistency between the 1977 and 1987 National Wealth
Survey, because the capital stock data from the late 1970s to the early 1980s could be
distorted by high inflation. Therefore, a further adjustment on real gross capital stock is
made.
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Table 3.1: Average Annual Growth Rate (%)
GDP Capital(K) Population(N) TFP
8.34% 8.04% 1.42% 3.86%
the disposal rate of tangible fixed assets in the manufacturing sector
between 1984–90 from Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey
(various years) by the Korea Statistical Association and Report on
Industrial Census (1988) by the Economic Planning Board.
3.2. Production Technology
This section provides the estimation result of the production
technology (Step 1 in Section 2.2) using the annual data. For the
convenience of calculating productivity, the aggregate production
technology is assumed to be
Yt 5 ut · At · F(Kt, Nt),
where F(Kt, Nt) is constant returns to scale.6











where w is the ratio of compensation of employees to GDP, and
D indicates a change. Table 3.1 reports the average annual growth
rates of GDP, capital stock, population, and TFP.7 Set TFP 5 1.0
in the initial year, and calculate the sequence of TFP and per
capita GDP/TFP as an estimate of f(k) 5 F(K, N)/N.
Step 2: Estimate the CES Function. F(K,N) is parameterized
as the CES production function. I avoid using the Cobb-Douglas
6 Alternatively, labor-augmenting technological progress: Yt 5 utF(Kt, AtNt) may be
considered. However, this form is not chosen due to estimation problem of productivity
growth. In fact, if F(Kt, AtNt) takes the Cobb-Douglas form, this form can be transformed
to A˜tF(Kt, Nt).
7 The estimated growth rate of 3.86 percent seems to be reasonable comparing to
previous studies. Chen (1979) reports 4.99 percent (1955–70, country level), Nishimizu
and Robinson (1984) report 3.71 percent (1960–77, manufacturing), Kwon (1986) reports
2.95 percent (1961–80, manufacturing), Dollar and Sokoloff (1990) report 6.1 percent
(1963–79, manufacturing), and so forth.
50 A. Ueda
Table 3.2: Production Technology
Estimate
CES Production function a 0.7556 (0.0354)
b 0.5887 (0.0068)
t 20.2422 (0.0244) R2 5 0.9998
Productivity ln A 1.1007 (0.1162)
g 0.8853 (0.3092)
Stochastic shocks r 0.8923 (0.0957) R2 5 0.982
s 0.0401 (D 2 W 5 0.972)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
production function that fixes the ratio of labor compensation to
output. The CES production function is parameterized as
f(k) 5 (akt 1 b)1/t
Estimate (a, b, t) by the nonlinear regression.
Step 3: Estimate Stochastic Shocks. To evaluate the Euler
equation (2.2), expectation scheme of productivity growth must
be parameterized. TFP growth may be caused by various factors
such as spillover effects of knowledge, learning by doing, or human
capital accumulation by education. However, because the purpose
here is not to seek the sources of the productivity growth and
because productivity is given (whatever the sources of productivity
growth) for an agent in the competitive economy, an arbitrary
simple scheme that fits the actual productivity change is assumed.
Productivity At is conventionally assumed to be related to the pro-
duction experiences (without shocks for simplicity): At ; A˜ · yg˜t ,
where yt 5 uAtf(kt)ju51.8 By simple manipulation, At 5 A · f(kt)g
where g 5 g˜/(1 2 g˜) and A is some constant. Estimate (A, g) and
an AR(1) process of {ut}
ln yt/fˆt 5 ln A 1 g · ln fˆt 1 ln ut
ln ut 5 r ln ut21 1 et,
where fˆt 5 f(kt; aˆ, bˆ, tˆ).
Table 3.2 reports the results of estimation of the production
technology. All of the estimates of parameters seem to be reason-
able and p values are less than 1 percent. With these estimates,
8 Other expectations scheme such as At 5 A · ygt or At 5 A · kgt were also tried, but
did not affect the major result described later.
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Standard errors are in parentheses.
per capita GDP in 1990 is yet almost half of the deterministic
steady state.
In estimating stochastic shocks, autocorrelation still remains
with assuming an AR(1) process. However, it becomes quite diffi-
cult to obtain a numerical solution by using a model with higher
order serial correlation including {ut21, ut22, . . .} in addition to kt
ut) as state variables, because of the “curse of dimensionality.”
Moreover, an introduction of higher order models may not be
meaningful, because the annual time series data are limited to 31
samples (1960–90). Bearing these limitations in mind, I chose an
AR(1) process instead of seeking higher order process.
4. RESULT
4.1. Optimizing Behavior
Due to the difficulty in obtaining convergence of the nonlinear
regression,9 b is fixed to 0.95 from 10 percent interest rate of
1-year time deposit between 1984 November and 1988 December
when the average annual inflation rate of CPI was 4.54 percent
in Korea.10 Therefore, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of utility m is only one estimator included in x.
With b 5 0.95, Table 4.1 reports estimates of m,11 and its asymp-
totic standard errors for 1960–90 and 1980–90, respectively. Fig-
ures 1 and 2 compare actual and predicted (simulated) investment
rate ([; (I/(I 1 C)), i.e., the government consumption is excluded)
9 A change of b causes a change of the deterministic steady state; consequently, a change
of the range of the state space of capital stock is inevitable (a change of m does not cause
this problem). The nonlinear regression may bid up b while hunting for the best fit for b
in the iteration, which may disastrously expand the state space.
10 Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistic Yearbook, 1992.
11 The values of mˆ seem to be quite small, but the values vary depending on the assumption
of b. If b is bigger than 0.95, mˆ becomes bigger.
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Figure 1. Investment behavior 1960–90.
with 95 percent asymptotic confidence intervals arising from esti-
mation errors of production technology and stochastic shocks.
During the period 1960–90, actual investment rates steadily
rose, while predicted investment rates are rather stable throughout
the period. The actual path clearly crosses the interval as illustrated
in Figure 1. The simulation with a numerical solution predicts
investment rates higher for the 60s and for the early 70s, and
lower for the late 70s and for the 80s than actual. Focusing on
the 1980s, however, the simulated path seems to predict the actual
path pretty well except 1990, as shown in Figure 2. The estimation
result suggests that the model explains investment decision in
1980s well, but that the model fails to explain the rise in investment
rates in the 1960s and 1970s. This result is robust by changing
some of the parameterization. By changing b, a simulated path
shifts parallel rather than rotating. Bigger b results in a higher
investment rate throughout the periods. A change of expectation
scheme of At does not affect the predicted behavior, either. For
example, parameterization such as At 5 kat , which assumes that
productivity is raised by spillover effects of knowledge generates
the similar predicted path. The result is also robust using active
labor as Nt for production instead of population, or changing the
population growth rate at the deterministic steady state.
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Figure 2. Investment behavior 1980–90.
4.2. Structural Change
During the period 1973–79, the Korean government intensively
push the heavy and chemical industries (HCI Project) by heavily
borrowing from abroad. Thanks to the project, manufacturing
shifts from the light industry in the 1960s to the heavy industry
in the 1980s. Therefore, it is not impossible that the transformation
of production technology changed investment behavior.
Table 4.2 presents the estimation result of production technol-
ogy for the period 1973–9012 during and after the structural change.
With these new estimates of production technology and previous
estimate of m, Figure 3 shows the actual path and the simulated
paths for 1960–9013 and 1973–90. Investment rates slightly shift
upward with the new production technology, but again, it is not
enough to explain the rise in investment rates in the 1970s.
4.3. Externalities Effects
So far, it has been assumed that a representative agent takes
the productivity growth as given. However, recent literature on
12 Because of the convergence problem of the nonlinear estimation, AR(1) process is
separately estimated.
13 Because estimation for the early periods (such as 1960–79) fails to obtain meaningful
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Figure 3. Structural change.
endogenous growth models has found that (human or physical)
capital could be underinvested in the competitive equilibrium
compared to a social optimum, because each agent behaves with-
out considering externalities of her investment (e.g., Romer, 1986;
Lucas, 1988). Also, effects of productive public services on growth
can be considered in addition to private capital in production
(Barro, 1990).
If part of the productivity growth is expected to be raised by
externalities of investment and if the government is capable to
control investment to some extent, investment rates could be
higher than the previous results. For example, effects of invest-
ment in infrastructure and public enterprises of heavy industries
on productivity growth might be considered in public investment
decisions. The close relationship between the government and
business groups in Korea might also help the governmental promo-
tion of investment. Then, taking into the policy effects on invest-
ment, consider production technology is
yt 5 ut · At · g(kt) · f(kt)
where g(k) 5 ka, which is a part of productivity, and ]y/]k 5
u A(g9(k)f(k) 1 g(k)f9(k)) in the Euler equation (2.2).
56 A. Ueda
Figure 4. Externalities.
Simulation results using this formula indicates that investment
rates become higher as externalities become bigger throughout
the period. That means the model again fails to explain the change
of investment behavior before 1980. However, if an economy shifts
from the competitive economy toward socially planned economy,
it is possible that investment rates are shifted up. Figure 4 illus-
trates the simulated paths with mˆ in which the lower bound with
a 5 0 and the higher bound with a 5 0.2 cover the actual path
the best by the nonlinear regression. The result suggests that the
shift from the lower bound to the upper bound occurs during the
period 1973–78 that coincides with the period of the HCI project.
However, a few shortcomings must be notified for this explanation.
First, the bound is not yet wide enough to cover the actual path,
even assuming the externality effect as big as a 5 0.2. Second,
the lower bound does not predict the actual path for the period
1960–68 well. Third, investment behavior does not seem to shift
back toward the competitive economy (i.e., the lower bound with
a 5 0) in spite of economic liberalization effort in the 1980s in
Korea.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of this paper has been to quantitatively investigate
whether or not investment behavior in Korea can be explained
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by market forces. The estimation result suggests that market forces
do not explain the rise in investment rates in the 1960s and 1970s,
although investment behavior in the 1980s coincides with opti-
mized investment behavior.
Two alternative models have been examined to investigate why
the hypothesis of market forces is rejected in the 1960s and 1970s.
Structural change from light industries to heavy industries in the
1970s also does not help to explain the rise of investment rates.
On the other hand, effects of externalities of investment may help
to explain the transition of investment behavior better than other
models, while it is also possible that, for example, underdeveloped
financial market bothered investment in early periods.
As previously studied, there are rich circumstantial evidences
that governments could play an important role in driving economic
growth in Korea. It is quite possible that the government interven-
tion was one of the sources to raise investment rates, although
further analysis is required to prove the relationship between
government interventions and investment behavior.
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